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In this paper I devise a new channel by means of which the (empir-
ically documented) positive correlation between in￿ ation and income
inequality can be understood. Available empirical evidence reveals
that in￿ ation increases wage dispersion. For this reason, the higher
the in￿ ation rate, the higher turns out to be the bene￿t, for a worker,
of making additional draws from the distribution of wages, before de-
ciding whether to accept or reject a job o⁄er. Assuming that some
workers have less access to information (wage o⁄ers) than others, I
show that the Gini coe¢ cient of income distribution turns out to be
an increasing function of the wage dispersion and, consequently, of the
rate of in￿ ation. Two examples are provided to illustrate the mecha-
nism.
1 Introduction
Several works in the economic literature link in￿ ation to income inequality
from an empirical perspective. Bulir (1998), Romer and Romer (1998)) and
Cardoso et alli (1995) are examples of this type.
Despite the fact that such distributional e⁄ects are an important issue in
public policy, though, the theoretical literature on the subject is surprisingly
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Search.
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1scarce. In particular, this literature still lacks new ideas and theoretical
arguments illustrating how correlations between in￿ ation and inequaltity can
be generated, in the long run, under dynamic settings in which individual
consumers maximize the discounted value of their utilities.
Analyses of the link between in￿ ation and inequality usually explore,
descriptively, how relationships between capitalists and workers, or between
debtors and creditors, are a⁄ected by in￿ ation. The usual explanation that
poor consumers have less access to interest-bearing money and thereby end
up paying a larger share of their income as in￿ ation tax can be included
under the debtor/creditor classi￿cation as well. A di⁄erent argument, linking
in￿ ation and income distribution thorough the sharing of the welfare costs
of in￿ ation, rather than through distributional e⁄ects, has been provided by
Cysne, Monteiro and Maldonado (2004).
In this paper I devise a new channel by means of which in￿ ation can
provoke income inequality1. The main idea is that consumers with more
information can bene￿t relatively more, in the job-search process, from the
increase of wage dispersion, than consumers with less information. Given
the stylized fact that wage dispersion is an increasing function of the rate
of in￿ ation2, the Gini coe¢ cient of income inequality turns out to increase
when in￿ ation increases. Two examples are o⁄ered to illustrate the proposed
mechanism.
The basic model used for the argument draws on Stokey and Lucas￿ s
(1989) version of McCall￿ s (1970) job-search model. The paper proceeds as
follows. Section 2 presents the basic model and assumptions. Subsection
2.1 formalizes the unconstrained consumer problem, in which the number of
draws is a choice variable, depending upon an idiosyncratic cost. Subsection
2.2 simpli￿es the analysis by assuming a cost function that makes the ￿rst
1More rigorously, this paper deals with long-run wage inequality. However, transfers
and capital income usually represent only a small fraction of most households￿total income.
For the United States, for instance, following the 1992 SCF (Survey of Consumer Finances),
transfers and capital income account in average for only around 28% of the total income of
the households surveyed. This percentage tends to be even lower in developing countries.
2Wage dispersion is particularly high when in￿ ation reaches a certain level and leads
to staggered (lagged) indexation. Under a (mandatory) ￿xed frequency of adjustments,
the ratio of nominal wages of a certain category, just after and before the adjustment,
is given by 1 + ￿; ￿ standing for the rate of in￿ ation. By these means, under staggered
indexaton, the higher the rate of in￿ ation, the higher the ratio of existing wages. Brazil
in the seventies and early eighties is an example of an economy facing such circumstances.
Simonsen (1970) and Dornbusch and Simonsen (1986) are usual sources on this issue.
Cardoso (1993), Cardoso et alli (1995) and Souza (2003) present more recent empirical
evidence that high rates of in￿ ation increase wage dispersion.
2draw free for all workers, whereas other draws are free for a subgroup of
workers, and prohibitively expensive for the remaining workers.
Under this constrained setting, which is going to be the one used to de-
liver the main result of the paper, I solve for the reservation wage and (in
subsection 2.3) for the long-run average wage of each of the two groups of
workers. The long-run average wage is calculated under the invariant dis-
tribution of the Markov process determined by the constrained optimization
problem. Subsection 2.4 is used to show how to calculate the Gini coe¢ cient
of income distribution under a given level of in￿ ation and wage dispersion.
The main result of the paper, as well as two examples, are delivered in section
3. Section 4 concludes.
2 The Model
I start by formalizing the unconstrained problem faced by the worker, when
he is allowed to choose the number of o⁄ers he can draw from the distribution
of wages. The givens of the model are the distribution of wage o⁄ers faced by
the workers, the distribution of technology/cost of acquiring additional job
o⁄ers and the probability that a certain worker faces, each period, of losing
his job.




; B[0;1); standing for the Borelians
in [0;1) and L for the Lebesgue measure in this space, consider a continuum
of workers. Each worker has certain technology/cost to get draws from the
exogenous distribution of wages. Other than that, workers are all equal. Such
a technology leads to a cost, for worker j; j 2 [0;1); of acquiring n draws
from the distribution of wages, given by kj(n).
For 0 < D < 1; consider the second measurable space (￿;F;p) and, in
this space, the measure q induced by the (real) wage function w: ￿ ! [0;D]:




; denote by F(t) the distribution
function that (q￿a:e: -uniquely) determines the measure q : F(t) = p(w ￿ t):
In the remaining, subindex j is only introduced when strictly necessary.
The consumer is not allowed to borrow or to lend. His consumption ct is






tct; 0 < b < 1
!
32.1 The Unconstrained Optimization
Once the consumer chooses n, he only considers, in the beginning of the next
period, the best (maximum) o⁄er w among the n o⁄ers. At this point, the
consumer can accept or turn down the best o⁄er. If he accepts, he stays
employed one period for sure. At the end of this period either he is laid o⁄,
with probability ￿; of he keeps his job and wage for sure for one more period,
with probability 1 ￿ ￿: The worker is never allowed to voluntarily quit his
job or to search while working. If he does not accept the o⁄er or if he is laid
o⁄, he restarts the problem by choosing another number of o⁄ers n for the
next period:The job o⁄ers are drawn independently from [0;D] according to
the measure q: q is known by all workers.
The formal analysis of the unconstrained problem starts backwards, by
assuming that the consumer has already decided about n: The decision at
this point, to which I turn now, is resolving about accepting or rejecting the
best o⁄er at hand. The states of the problem are given by the wage o⁄ers at
hand, as well as by the status E (employed) and U (unemployed).
When already employed with wage w; the value function of any consumer
is:
v(w;E) = w + (1 ￿ ￿)bv(w;E) + ￿bV (1)
where V is the optimum present value for the consumer when he follows the
whole course of choosing the optimal strategy, starting with the choice of n:




fw + (1 ￿ ￿)bv(w;E) + ￿bV ￿ k(n);bV ￿ k(n)g (2)





1 ￿ b(1 ￿ ￿)
￿ k(n); bV ￿ k(n)
￿
(3)
Since the optimization above is carried out under a ￿xed value of n, and
since b and ￿ are given parameters, the above equation implies that the
optimum strategy is of a reservation-wage type. The reservation wage ￿ w can
then be expressed as a function of V by the equalization of the two terms
in the second member of (3):
￿ w = bV (1 ￿ b(1 ￿ ￿) ￿ ￿) (4)
4Since V is the value function when n assumes its optimal value, ￿ w is not





bV ￿ k(n) (= ￿ w+￿bV
1￿b(1￿￿) ￿ k(n)) if w < ￿ w
w+￿bV





Make F(r;n) stand for the distribution function of the order statistics of or-
der r; of a sample of size n; and E(n;n) for the respective expectation operator.
De￿ne:




The unconstrained consumer problem reads:
V = max
n G(n)
Note in the equation above that the optimum n is equal to plus in￿nity
when k(n) = 0. Indeed, since the consumer makes his decision based on the
highest o⁄er, the higher the number of o⁄ers he gets the better, because all
additional information can be simply disregarded.
2.2 The Constrained Optimization
From now on I want to incorporate into the model, in the easiest possible
way, a usual real-world situation in which some consumers end up with more
wage o⁄ers than others, irrespective of their e⁄orts to change it.
The most direct way of capturing this occurrence, without introducing
unnecessary calculations that would not add to the main point of the paper,
is by postulating that the cost of the ￿rst draw is zero for all consumers,
and that the cost of any quantity of additional draws is zero for a ￿rst group
of consumers (say, all j in [0;￿ j)) and in￿nite for the remaining consumers
(all j in [￿ j;1]). From the analysis of the precedent subsection, assuming this
technology is equivalent to assuming that consumers in cohorts 0 to ￿ j will
always end up with one job o⁄er, and consumers in cohorts from ￿ j to 1 will
have a number of o⁄ers tending to in￿nity.
From this point on, I will denominate workers in [0;￿ j) by ￿group P￿(P
for poor) and workers in [￿ j;1] by group R (R for rich).
Given the above construction, it is an easy guess that consumers in group
R will be be better o⁄ than consumers in group P. The formal point I want
to make, though, does not concern the level of the ratio between the wages
in group R and group P. It concerns the variation of this level with the rate
of in￿ ation.
5The constrained problem solved by the consumer under the cost function
postulated above is of a simpler nature. He only has to decide whether to
accept or reject the best wage o⁄er at hand, given the number of draws
from the distribution allowed by nature. There is no previous decision about
n: The constrained value function of consumers making n draws from the














in which case the reservation wage is given by:
￿ w(j) =
b
1 ￿ b(1 ￿ ￿)
Z
[ ￿ w(j);D]
(w ￿ ￿ w(j))dF(nj;nj) (6)





1, 0 ￿ j < ￿ j





The reservation wage divides [0;D] into two regions: [0;D] = [0; ￿ w) [
[￿ w;D]. Denote by N the acceptance region [￿ w;D].
2.3 The Stationary Distribution and the Long-Run Real
Average Wage
Make ￿t in ([0;D],B[0;D]); represent the measure of the wage o⁄ers received
by a certain worker at time t. This measure is determined by P : [0;D] ￿
BD ! [0;1]; the transition function of the problem, as shown below by (8)
and (9).
The transition function P is determined in the following way. For ele-
ments of the (induced) sample space w in [0; ￿ w); assign a probability measure
for sets B in B[0;D] equal to q(B): Otherwise, for w in [￿ w;D]; assign, measure
0; ￿; 1 ￿ ￿ or 1 to any B in B[0;D]; depending, respectively, if neither f0g or
w is in B, if w = 2 B but 0 2 B; if w 2 B but 0 = 2 B or if both w 2 B and 0 2
B:
In order to talk about an invariant distribution of wages in this economy,
it is necessary to show that the distribution of wage o⁄ers has one and only





￿(mo(t))(B) = mo(t+1)(B);B 2 B[0;D] (9)
Cysne (2004) provides this demonstration for a more general model.
The next step is ￿nding the invariant distribution ￿; which happens to be
the ￿xed point of T ￿ in the space of probability measures in ([0;D],B[0;D]).
As shown in Stokey and Lucas (1989, c. 10), for sets C ￿ N (of employed
workers) this invariant measure is given by the solution to:
￿t+1(C) = ￿t(N





c) + ￿t(N)￿ (11a)




Since all mass of wage o⁄ers in Nc implies a wage equal to zero, the long-
run average wage of a certain worker j (which coincides with a cross-sectional










where ￿ w(j) follows from (6) and the measure q has as distribution function
F(nj;nj); with nj being given by (7).
2.4 Income Distribution
The existence of di⁄erent numbers of draws from the distribution of wages
among workers leads to di⁄erent income patterns. To measure income in-
equality I use the Gini coe¢ cient of income distribution. The Gini coe¢ cient
(G) is a ratio between two areas. The ￿rst area is the one between the the
curves f(j) = j and the Lorenz curve L(j); to be de￿ned below. The second
area is the one between the curves f(j) = j and g(j) = 0: In all cases; j runs
from 0 to 1: By integrating:












m denoting the measure in the measurable space ([0;1);B[0;1)) determined
by (7) and (12). The formula above uses the fact that the long-run average
wage A is an increasing function of j:
73 Main Result
Consider two di⁄erent economies, say, L and H, with di⁄erent rates of in￿ a-
tion, ￿L and ￿H (L for ￿ low￿ and H for ￿ High￿ ). The only di⁄erence between
economy L and economy H, provoked by the rate of in￿ ation, is that the dis-
persion of the wage o⁄ers in economy H; to be de￿ned precisely below, is
greater than in economy L: Other than that, the economies are the same. In
each economy, a fraction ￿ j of the consumers (which I have called group P in
section 2) has access to only one wage o⁄er, whereas the remaining fraction,
1 ￿ ￿ j; (group R) can have as many draws from the distribution of wages as
they desire. Other than that, consumers in each group, and in each economy,
are the same.
The exogenous distribution of wage o⁄ers is given in each period, respec-
tively, in economies L and H, by the arbitrary measures qL; with support in
[aL;bL] and qH; with support in [aH;bH]: By assumption, due to the higher
rate of in￿ ation in economy H :








where EqLw and EqHw stand for the expected value of the distribution of
wages in each economy, respectively, under the measures qL and qH. The
main result of the paper is given by Proposition 1 below. To simplify the
calculations I work under the assumption that the parameters of the model
satisfy, in both economies:
￿
1 + ￿￿




Proposition 1 Consider two economies as described above. Then, the Gini
coe¢ cient of income distribution in the economy with high in￿ation is higher
than the one in the economy with low in￿ation.
Proof. Consider, ￿rst, group R. In each economy, following (6), making
nj ! 1 in both cases, the reservation wages of workers of group R, in
economies, L and H converge in measure, respectively, to ￿ wLR = bL and
￿ wHR = bH; and the average wages (using (12)) to ALR =
bL
1+￿ and AHR =
bH
1+￿:
Now consider group P: Following (6) and (16), their reservation wage is
given, respectively, in economy L and H, by ￿ wLP =
￿
1+￿￿EqLw and ￿ wHP =
8￿






Next, consider the Gini coe¢ cient of income distribution, initially in econ-






￿ jALP+(1￿￿ j)ALR 0 ￿ j < ￿ j
￿ jALP+(j￿￿ j) ALR
￿ jALP+(1￿￿ j)ALR
￿ j ￿ j ￿ 1
and the Gini coe¢ cient:
GL(ZL) = 1 ￿
￿ j(2 ￿ ￿ j) + (1 ￿ ￿ j)2Z




ALP : Note that G0
L(ZL) > 0: Therefore, since the ￿ j is he same
for both economies L and H:
GL < GH ,
ALR
ALP










which is guaranteed by (the higher dispersion hypothesis) (15).
In Proposition I used the assumption that group R can draw an in￿nite
number of points of the distribution given by qH; as well as assumption (16).
The two examples below show that neither of these assumptions is actually
necessary. Example one drops the ￿rst assumption, and example 2 drops
both assumptions.
It is necessary for the main result of the paper, in general, only assuming
that group R has one more draw from the distribution than group P, and
that wages are more disperse in the economy where in￿ ation is higher.
Example 1 Here I drop the assumption, used in Proposition 1, that the
number of wage o⁄ers in group R goes to in￿nity. Assume that qL and qH
have support in just two points each, qL in faL;bLg and qH in faH;bHg;
with 0 < aH < aL < bL < bH ￿ D: Masses (by assumption, all strictly
positive) in these points are denoted, respectively, by qH(aH) = qL(aL) = qa
and qL(bL) = qH(bH) = qb: Suppose the transformation from L to H is mean
preserving, meaning that qaaL + qbbL = qaaH + qbbH:
9In economy L the rate of in￿ation is ￿L and, in economy H, ￿H; with
￿L < ￿H: In each economy, in each period, consumers in [0;￿ j), when unem-
ployed, have one draw from the distribution of wages (given, respectively, by
the measures qL and qH), whereas consumers in [￿ j;1] have two draws from
the distribution of wages. Other than that, the economies and the respective
groups are the same.
Take economy L. In this economy, workers draw wages aL and bL with
masses qa and qb; respectively. First note that if the distribution were degen-
erated (aL = bL); then there would be no distinction, in economy L; between
those who make one draw and those who make two draws from the distri-
bution of wages. Indeed, in this case the marginal amount of information
provided by the second draw is null. In this economy the Gini coe¢ cient of
income distribution would be zero, since all workers would have the same av-
erage income. It is trivial, though, that the Gini coe¢ cient in economy R;
which by assumption would be characterized by a nondegenerated distribution
of wage o⁄ers, would be greater than the Gini of economy L.
Now suppose, more interestingly, that aL 6= bL: Still regarding only econ-
omy L; the expected values of the distribution of wages, for groups P and R;










Note that EPw ￿ ERw: In a variation of assumption (16), I assume here




(an equivalent hypothesis also applying to economy H). This is a necessary
and su¢ cient condition for the reservation wage of both groups, P and R; in
each economy, to be below the lower bound a:
The reservation wages in economy L of groups P and R are given, re-
spectively, by ￿ wLP = b
1+b￿ELPw and ￿ wLR = b
1+b￿ELR; with ￿ wLP ￿ ￿ wLR (the
reservation wage of workers in group R is higher because workers in this








10Using (14) and (13), the Gini coe¢ cient of income distribution (still in econ-
omy L), as above, is given by (17). Also as in the demonstration of Proposi-
tion 1:
GL < GH ,
ALR
ALP
= ZL < ZH =
AHR
AHP














ALP is an increasing function of
bL
aL; the relative range of the distribution









AHP and that GL < GH :
Example 2 Regarding Proposition 1, in this second example I drop the as-
sumption that n tends to in￿nity (here, n = 2), as well as assumption (16).
Assume that qL and qH are given, respectively, by the uniform distribution in
[2;3] and [1;4]: In the respective supports, this leads to the distribution func-
tions FL(1;1)(s) = ￿2+s , FH(1;1)(s) = ￿1=4+(1=4)s; FL(2;2)(s) = 4￿4s+s2;
FH(2;2)(s) = 1=16￿(1=8)s+(1=16)s2: Using (6), and (12), after some tedious
calculations, the reservation wages and the average wages, in each case, can




Rich 2.71 3.44 1.27
Res. Wage Worker
Poor 2.61 3.25 1.24
Rich 2.81 3.64 1.037
Aver. Wage Worker
Poor 2.75 3.51 1.024
The most important point in Table 1 is that the ratio of the average wages,
between economy H and economy L, is higher for the rich than for the poor.
By (18), this implies that income is more concentrated in economy H than in




AHP , as presented in the demonstration
of Proposition 1, is that the rich are more able to take advantage of the
(mean-preserving) increase of uncertainty than the poor.
It is also interesting to note that (as one would expect) the rich always
have a higher reservation wage and a higher average wage than the poor, in
both economies, L and H.
11And that, for both groups, R and L, the reservation wage and the average
wage in economy H is higher than in economy L. This fact shows that
both groups are able to take advantage of the increase of uncertainty, because
of the option-nature of the job-search mechanism (bad draws can always be
discarded).
4 Conclusion
In this paper I formalize a link between in￿ ation and the Gini coe¢ cient of
income inequality, assuming that higher rates of in￿ ation lead to an increase
of the dispersion of wage o⁄ers. Under this setting, the higher the in￿ ation
rate, the higher turns out to be the bene￿t, for a worker, of making additional
draws from the distribution of wages. Assuming that some workers have
less access to information (wage o⁄ers) than others, I show that the Gini
coe¢ cient of income distribution turns out to be an increasing function of
the rate of in￿ ation. Two examples are provided to illustrate the mechanism.
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